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Abstract
Nihon Senshi (Military History of Japan) was part of the new Imperial Japanese Army’s 
attempt to tie itself to examples from Japan’s “warring states” period, similar to scholars 
who created a feudal “medieval” time in the Japanese past to fit into Western historiogra-
phy, and intellectuals who discovered a “traditional” spirit called bushidō as a counterpart 
for English chivalry. The interpretations of these campaigns, placing the “three unifiers” 
of the late sixteenth century as global leaders in the modernization of military tactics and 
technology, show the Imperial Japanese Army’s desire to be seen as a “modern” military 
through its invented “institutional” history. 
Keywords: Imperial Japanese Army, military history, invented tradition, Meiji period, 
bushidō. 
Izumljene zgodovine: Nihon senshi Japonske cesarske vojske v obdobju Meiji
Izvleček
Nihon senshi (Vojaška zgodovina Japonske) je del prizadevanj nove Japonske cesarske vojske, 
da bi se povezala s primeri iz obdobja vojskujočih se dežel, podobno kakor so zgodovinarji 
ustvarili japonski fevdalni »srednji vek«, da bi se ujemal z zahodnim zgodovinopisjem, in 
kakor so intelektualci odkrili »tradicionalni« duh imenovan bushidō, ki je ustrezal pojmu 
angleškega viteštva. Interpretacije teh vojaških spopadov, ki so predstavile »tri združevalce« 
poznega šestnajstega stoletja kot globalne voditelje pri modernizaciji vojaških taktik in 
tehnologije, razkrivajo željo Japonske cesarske vojske, da bi jo s pomočjo izumljene »in-
stitucionalne« zgodovine obravnavali kot »moderno« vojsko.
Ključne besede: Japonska cesarska vojska, vojaška zgodovina, izumljene tradicije, obd-
obje Meiji, bushidō
Over the thirty-one years from 1893 to 1924, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) 
General Staff ’s historical division produced thirteen volumes, each covering a 
battle from Japan’s “warring states” (sengoku) period, in a series entitled Nihon 
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Senshi (日本戦史; Military History of Japan). Section 9 of the 4th division of the 
General Staff Office, headed by a colonel with a staff of three, was responsible for 
producing these historical analyses of the past Japanese battles (Nihon Rikugun Ga 
Yoku Wakaru Jiten 2002, 324). Nihon Senshi, despite the implication of the name, 
is not a comprehensive history of warfare throughout Japan’s history. The thirteen 
volumes cover significant campaigns by Japan’s “three unifiers”, Oda Nobunaga, 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, in the mid-sixteenth and early sev-
enteenth centuries, beginning with Tokugawa’s campaigns to secure hegemony in 
1600 and 1615, then circling back to the beginning of Oda Nobunaga’s rise and 
moving forward through the major campaigns of his and Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 
career. The following table shows the focus and publication date of each volume:
Table 1: Focus and publication date of each volume of Nihon Senshi
Volume Focal Campaign or Battle Year(s) of Campaign Year of Preface Year of Publication
1 Sekigahara 1600 1893 1893
2 Osaka Summer & Winter 1615 1896 1897
3 Okehazama 1560 1898 1902
4 Anegawa 1573 1899 1901
5 Mikatagahara 1574 1901 1902
6 Nagashino 1575 1902 1903
7 Chugoku (Western Japan) 1576-82 1903 1911
8 Yamazaki 1582 1903 1920
9 Yanase (Shizugatake) 1583 1903 1907
10 Komaki (Nagakute) 1584 1908 1908
11 Kyushu 1587 1910 1911
12 Odawara 1590 1913 1893(?)1
13 Korean Invasions 1592-98 1923 1924
1
In the secondary scholarship of late medieval and early modern Japanese warfare, 
certain battles are treated as iconic—the “kessen”, or decisive battles of the Sengoku 
jidai, the Warring States period. Not merely representative of sixteenth-century 
warfare, these battles define it, in popular history books, on movie and television 
screens, and in video games.2 Meanwhile, battles such as Funaokayama in 1511, 
1 I have been unable to find a suitable explanation for why the Odawara volume lists 1893 as its date 
of publication, but has a preface dated 1913. Given that it is the twelfth volume of thirteen, I feel 
confident in assuming the publication date is a misprint on the part of the publisher of the 1978 
reprint, Murata Shoten.
2 The director Akira Kurosawa’s masterpiece film Kagemusha concludes with a climactic, though 
historically inaccurate, recreation of the Battle of Nagashino; video game titles available world-
wide that include battles from this list include the Kessen series and the Nobunaga’s Ambition 
series by Koei. 
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between two Ashikaga claimants to the title of shōgun and their powerful daimyō 
supporters, or the 1578 Battle of Mimigawa, a decisive clash between rival war-
lords in western Japan, are given minor consideration. It is not important at this 
time to debate the merits of one battle versus another in any list of major samurai 
conflicts. However, it is instructive to think about why some battles have achieved 
a certain status in both military history and popular culture. Academic historians 
are not the only ones who fashion “history”. I contend that the Imperial Japanese 
Army historical section chose to include these victories by the “three unifiers” of 
Japan because they assessed them as the beginning of a “modern” and “Japanese” 
military history. These battles provided tactical and strategic lessons, but in ad-
dition could be shaped to show historical antecedents for the IJA itself to claim. 
This paper is thus an exploratory attempt to situate the production of these 
histories as an institutional microcosm of a larger discourse of national identity 
formation ongoing within the Meiji and Taishō state. Due to space limitations, 
this paper will not include a comprehensive analysis of each volume and how 
well (or poorly) each battle is portrayed. Rather, I will focus on why these his-
tories were written at this time; why these particular battles were chosen as 
representative examples of a Japanese “military history”; and the transnational 
intellectual currents and political events that encouraged and shaped their pro-
duction. Comparison with contemporary Japanese intellectual and institutional 
“invented traditions” that attempted to negotiate the complexities of the na-
tion’s emerging modernity suggests that Nihon Senshi was one manifestation of 
the IJA’s same reconciliation between the conflicting identities of a “Japanese” 
and a “modern” or “Westernized” institution. 
Yamagata Aritomo, the primary architect of the Imperial Japanese Army of the 
Meiji period, faced several considerable challenges as he attempted to turn an army 
of rebellious provincials into a modern, professional force.3 The early Imperial Jap-
anese Army was a hodgepodge of former samurai and conscripted peasants, led 
by an officer corps divided by regional factionalism. The 1877 Seinan War, when 
Imperial forces defeated the rebel Satsuma army of Saigō Takamori, revealed the 
limitations of conscripted peasants thrust into the role of soldier. Even seem-
ingly simple matters like adjusting to modern European-style uniforms caused 
3 Yamagata started as a military leader during the Boshin War which put the Meiji government in 
power, and led Imperial forces during the Seinan War; during the Meiji period he was variously 
the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army (both of these 
multiple times, and sometimes concurrently), Home Minister, and Prime Minister twice. Of the 
“Meiji oligarchs” he had the most influence over the IJA, and regardless of what his specific title 
was at any given point during the time examined in this paper, it is safe to say he was the driving 
force behind the shaping of the IJA, either directly or through his disciples. 
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considerable consternation for both commoners and samurai, unused to “uncom-
fortable” Western-style dress (Drea 2009). The samurai-led rebellion demonstrat-
ed that excessive ties based on regional affiliation and the privileged class con-
sciousness of samurai within the ranks drew loyalty away from the central Meiji 
state and the Imperial Japanese Army itself. Samurai prior to the rebellion were 
often looked on as old-fashioned and even parasitical; after the rebellion, they 
were a danger (Benesch 2014, 44–45). At the same time, the superior performance 
of the smaller samurai forces against larger and better equipped conscript units 
showed a need to indoctrinate the new army with samurai esprit and loyalty, di-
rected not to a feudal lord but to the IJA command and, ultimately, the emperor.  
The Seinan War also exposed the IJA’s inadequacy at planning and executing large 
operations (Matsushita 1963, 51). Until 1877 the IJA relied on French officer 
advisers, who focused on teaching lower level unit tactics at the expense of large-
scale operations. American military texts on the U.S. Civil War were popular with 
Japanese officers, as were the formulaic “principles of war” devised by the French 
officer Antoine de Jomini; these simple and easy to remember “rules” were easily 
understood in translation. The German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz, on 
the other hand, was deemed “overly complex” and largely ignored (Drea 2009, 
27-28). The overemphasis on small unit tactics correspondingly led to poor per-
formance with regard to large unit manoeuvres and logistics, and if the IJA found 
it difficult to move troops from central Japan to southern Kyūshū, projecting mil-
itary power outside of the country would be impossible. Yamagata realized that 
the IJA needed to improve its tactical and operational capabilities to be taken 
seriously as a modern military force by the outside world, primarily the West, but 
also its closer rivals the Chinese and Korean courts. 
Yamagata and his fellow army leaders thus needed to find both a way to instil an 
institutional consciousness in the “hodgepodge” of former samurai and peasant 
conscripts, and models which the IJA could use as instructional ones in training 
the staff officers and commanders responsible for creating an expeditionary force. 
The 1880s saw the IJA reorganise to become a foreign expeditionary force (Ōe 
1985). Edward Drea (2009) asserted that historical circumstances shaped Japan’s 
first modern army, while international pressures determined the pathways forward 
available to it. For Japan to be a first rank nation, the Meiji leadership believed, 
they must have a first rank army, one capable of projecting the emperor’s will and 
Japanese power outside of the nation’s borders (Kurono 2004). Yamagata and the 
IJA leadership believed that failure to project power overseas would doom Japan 
to second-class status. This is the traditional reading of “international pressures” 
as Drea (2009) frames it. However, the IJA exercised agency in choosing which 
pathway to take forward. Yamagata initially chose to use foreign models, as I shall 
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discuss shortly, but grounded them in an idealized Japanese traditional “history”; 
this synthesis of a “modern” military with a “historical” tradition is shown clearly 
in the campaign histories of the IJA General Staff ’s historical department. 
To create a sense of common military ethos that melded commoners and ex-sam-
urai together, Yamagata appealed to an idealized samurai tradition: not from the 
Edo period, whence the warrior class had stagnated as indigent bureaucrats, but 
from the greatly romanticized medieval chūsei age of war tales. Drea (2009, viii) 
notes that from the start the IJA attempted to find instructional examples for 
its core values of loyalty, service, and personal sacrifice to the emperor in “real or 
imagined precedents”. By highlighting figures like Kusunoki Masashige, lauded 
as the loyal retainer of Emperor Go-Daigo who heroically resisted the military 
government on Go-Daigo’s behalf in the 1330s, the Meiji leaders redirected the 
loyalty of the samurai retainer away from a feudal lord and towards the Emperor 
and broadened it to the entire army and Japanese population at large. In this man-
ner, Yamagata created a history for the IJA, to give its soldiers a unifying focus of 
loyalty (the emperor) that transcended class and regional divisions.
It should be noted, however, that while the historical precedents chosen were 
uniquely Japanese, the process was not; Western countries, especially Yamagata’s 
favoured model of Germany (which, it should be noted, officially united as a na-
tion-state three years after the start of the Meiji Restoration) were also creating 
their own “traditions” for the same purposes. Through the Meiji Emperor’s partic-
ipation in Western-style military ceremonies and the 1882 Imperial Rescript to 
Soldiers and Sailors, the soldiers’ “traditional” bond to the emperor was codified 
and strengthened in very “modern” ways (Drea 2009; Harries and Harries 1991). 
Eric Hobsbawm called the period from 1870 to 1914 one of the “mass production 
of tradition” in Europe. According to Hobsbawm, traditions are invented “more 
frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social 
patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed.” The period referenced was 
one of significant change worldwide, as societies the world over tackled the chal-
lenges presented by industrialized modernity (Hobsbawm in Benesch 2014, 6, 
10). Meiji Japan provides an interesting case for observation of this phenomenon, 
as the transformation from a feudal to “modern” society was abruptly imposed by 
the new Meiji government, with the majority of these changes involving the im-
portation of an alien, Western product or concept. Japan had to adapt and mod-
ernize to prevent the fate of colonization and Western domination seen in much 
of the world. The late nineteenth century was divided into “first rank” nations that 
colonized, and the rest of the world who were the victims of such imperialism. 
Japan had to propel itself into that first rank tier; yet at what point would that 
change the nation so much that it ceased being “Japan”? 
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The IJA was thus but one significant participant in the overall struggle of Japan to 
invent itself as a modern country, one that by definition has a “past”; this struggle 
not only occurred in other “modern” countries of the time, but was a necessary 
condition for modernity. Stefan Tanaka (2004, 29) asserts that this “discovery and 
separation of the past” is one of the central components of the Meiji period. “One 
of the constituent parts of modernity is the separation and denigration of the past, 
as something to move away from.” The idea of “history” in Japan had up until this 
time generally followed a cyclical Confucian narrative, with imperial reign dates 
as the standard unit of demarcation: the Emperor reigned, the events of the reign 
were recorded, the Emperor died and a new Emperor reigned, the cycle repeating 
itself. In contrast, nineteenth-century Western historical theory saw history as a 
linear narrative of national development; events that caused change demarcated 
one era from the previous one (Keirstead 1998). 
Meiji thinkers, like Fukuzawa Yukichi, recognised this difference: Fukuzawa be-
moaned that Japan had 2,500 years of “stagnation” as opposed to “progress”, and 
therefore could not be said to have a “history”. For Japan to be modern in the 
present, the past would have to be separated from it as different, then constructed 
into a usable history. Tanaka (2004) identifies the 1871 order for preservation and 
inventory of the Shōsōin storehouse and other repositories of artefacts as the be-
ginning of Japan’s “discovery” of its past, as such cataloguing imbued a collection 
of items with meaning as having “historical” value, where the previous fervour for 
the “new” and “modern” ignored and even destroyed such items as old and useless. 
This interest in preserving objects from the Japanese past was much driven by 
transnational ideas of each nation having a past worth preserving. Cultural and 
historical exhibitions were, at this time, an “international phenomenon”, and in 
fact one impetus for the Shōsōin survey was to find suitable objects that would 
represent Japanese history and culture at the 1873 World’s Fair in Vienna. At a 
time when Japan struggled to keep its identity while striving to be more and more 
like the West, artefacts imbued with this historical value provided that anchor to 
its unique past. 
Indeed, if history was to be understood as a linear progression, then for a coun-
try to be “modern” it necessarily required a “past” from which it had evolved. In 
1889 the Ministry of Education directed prominent historians to come up with 
a standard periodization of Japanese history, along the Western historiographic 
model. The Japanese past was thus reconfigured to demonstrate progression of 
events from one era to the next. The historian Nishi Amane coined the term chūsei 
as an analogue for the medieval period of Europe; Nishi and other historians like 
Hara Katsurō, armed with training in European historiography, found parallels 
between Japanese and Western (European) institutions (such as the European 
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medieval manor and the Japanese chūsei-era shōen) that allowed the Japanese past 
to be divided with the same ancient-medieval-modern structure. Conscious of 
European historiography (Marxist or otherwise) that saw a feudal medieval era 
as a necessary stage of development for the modern nation, historians like Nishi 
and Hara understood the implications for Japan. A chūsei period in Japanese his-
tory, as the temporal locus of national identity, placed Japan with the “gifted few” 
first-rank countries that could lay claim to a history with modernity as its end 
state (Keirstead 1998).4 In addition to external recognition by the community of 
“modern nations”, this broadened the past from a succession of imperial reigns 
to a “national” history for all Japanese, a critical step in the project of building a 
national consciousness. Keirstead asserts that this location of a historical origin of 
modernity in the middle ages (like Europe) solved the riddle of whether or not 
modernization meant the sacrifice of a uniquely Japanese identity. By identifying 
an analogous starting point for progress and a parallel trajectory similar to Eu-
rope’s, Japan could embrace both a modern present and traditional past.
In this way, history is an “invented tradition”, providing a departure point from 
which the modern Japanese nation evolved. As Hobsbawm suggested, the Meiji 
period was a time of continuous invention and reinvention of tradition, as the 
Japanese struggled to define what it meant to be “Japanese”. Meiji period Bud-
dhists cited medieval religious works and figures to give historical credence to 
their responses to modern issues (Keirstead 1998). In his 2014 book Inventing 
the Way of the Samurai, Oleg Benesch impressively describes the Meiji period in-
vention of a bushidō “warrior ethic” tradition. Bushidō had no coherent expression 
prior to the nineteenth century. Initially it was proposed by Ōzaki Yukio in ar-
ticles in 1889 and 1891 as a possible Japanese counterpart to the English chiv-
alric tradition, which he felt was responsible for Great Britain’s imperial success. 
Christian intellectuals like Uemura Masahisa and Nitobe Inazō also identified 
bushidō with the medieval, but a specifically Christian chivalry. Nationalist schol-
ars Suzuki Chikara and Inoue Tetsujirō located bushidō’s roots in the martial and 
masculine chūsei medieval era, the same period in which contemporary historians 
had located Japan’s modern origins, as described above. Thus an idea invented as a 
native analogue to a European concept, shaped around Edo period literature, was 
collectively presumed to have nostalgic antecedents in the age of martial heroes 
from the twelfth through sixteenth centuries (Benesch 2014). 
Though the precise nature of any connection between the periodization of a Jap-
anese chūsei period by historians around 1889 and the selection of the thirteen 
4 Keirstead (1998, 51–56) also notes that Hara was one of several prominent historians that were 
products of the Tokyo Imperial University history department, organised under the direction of 
Ludwig Riess, a German historian who had once been research assistant to Leopold von Ranke. 
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campaigns studied by the IJA military history section beginning in 1893 is un-
confirmed at this time, the reasoning in selecting battles from the transition pe-
riod between the “medieval” and “early modern” appears consistent: if Japan had 
a “medieval” chūsei period, then warfare, as expressed by the campaigns of Japan’s 
“three unifiers”, must surely have been a major catalyst for the nation’s movement 
into the “early modern” kinsei period. Yamagata certainly drew inspiration from 
the entire chūsei period—the prominence of Kusunoki Masashige, as previously 
mentioned, attests to that. Yet the battles of Kusunoki against the Hōjō and Ashi-
kaga are not found in the campaign studies. Nor are the Minamoto and Taira in 
the 1180s, or the Ōnin War of the late 1400s. While those conflicts could provide 
IJA soldiers with tales of heroism and sacrifice to train their spirits, they lack the 
critical component of modernity necessary to be worthy of detailed analysis at 
the operational and tactical levels for use in training IJA officers in how to wage 
modern war. Whereas Western militaries could look over the previous two hun-
dred years to Lee and Grant, Napoleon and Wellington, Washington, the Duke of 
Marlboro, and Vauban, Japan’s peaceful Edo period left them with few recent ex-
amples of military action. The 19th century Boshin War and the Seinan War were 
not only too recent to lend any “historicity” to the IJA, but were fought between 
the very conflicting groups Yamagata was trying to integrate into a cohesive force. 
The campaigns of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, 
in the standard periodization narrative, brought Japan out of the chūsei and into 
the early modern kinsei. These battles were far enough back in time to be “histo-
ry”, but “modern” enough to be useful examples, firearms having been introduced 
as a significant battlefield presence in the decades before the first chronological 
campaign (Okehazama in 1560, volume 3). As such, by locating the “roots” of 
the IJA’s military tradition in the transition between the chūsei and the kinsei, the 
IJA staked a claim to a trajectory of military modernity similar to its aspirational 
“first-rank” Western peers. 
If these thirteen campaigns were chosen in part because they were the “highlight” 
battles at the beginning of Japan’s “modern” age, they were also chosen as specific 
tactical and operational examples to train the Meiji IJA as a modern expeditionary 
force. Again, IJA leaders initially looked for models on how to instruct their staffs 
outside Japan. By the early 1880s, the IJA leadership turned to Germany for help 
in professionalizing its officer corps. Yamagata had studied in Prussia, and the 
Prussian victory over the French in 1870 cemented the Prussian General Staff ’s 
reputation as the pinnacle of military science. Yamagata’s protégé Katsura Tarō 
and Army Minister Ōyama Iwao led a delegation to Germany in 1885 to request 
an instructor for the newly established General Staff College. At Field Marshal 
Helmuth von Moltke’s personal direction, Major Jakob Meckel, an experienced 
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instructor and staff officer, was sent back with the Japanese as a military instructor 
(Drea 2009; Kurono 2004; Ōe 1985). Originally another officer was recommend-
ed to Moltke by Schlieffen, but Moltke strategically chose to send the more capa-
ble officer to Turkey to help rebuild their army and counterbalance the Russians, 
Turkey having been defeated by the Tsar’s forces in the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877–78 (Kurono 2004; Ōe 1985).
The assignment of the more “administrative” and less tactically-gifted Meckel 
instead would have significant ramifications for the IJA. Meckel instituted an 
educational program based on the Prussian model, more focused on the theory of 
military art and science than his French predecessors’ teachings on small-unit tac-
tics. To teach the application of theory, he took his students to study and practice 
military manoeuvres on terrain models and in the field, similar to the staff rides 
military officers engage in today. Meckel also introduced military history to the 
IJA curriculum through the study of historical campaigns to illustrate tactical and 
operational lessons, clearly setting a precedent for the IJA General Staff ’s cam-
paign studies (Drea 2009, 58).  
Meckel’s practical program of instruction, though he was only in Japan three years 
(1885–1888), won over even officers from factions that had preferred the French 
approach, and earned him high praise (Kurono 2004). However, his influence, 
both good and bad, would be seen more clearly in the IJA’s performance in the 
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. Meckel, not the most imaginative or 
intellectual staff officer, preached action over thought: his heavy emphasis on in-
fantry manoeuvres influenced the massive, casualty-intensive infantry charges of 
the Russo-Japanese War, and would continue to predominate in Japanese plan-
ning through World War II. Ōe (1985) observes that Meckel’s instruction focused 
on the tactical and operational levels of warfare, ignoring the strategic lessons of 
Clausewitz, possibly because he felt they were too difficult to teach through in-
terpreters, but it is just as likely that Meckel simply cared less for strategic think-
ing. Ōe contends that this lack of strategic instruction would become a systemic 
problem in the IJA, leading to the misguided and haphazard strategies seen in 
China and the Pacific War. Ōe believes that Meckel’s study of history, from which 
an understanding of strategy is derived, failed to take root in Japan. However, 
the IJA did study history, but Meckel’s emphasis on tactics and operations at the 
expense of strategy would influence not only the case studies chosen for the IJA’s 
own analysis, but also the ways in which Japanese military planners for several 
generations would interpret these as templates for execution. 
 Unfortunately, at the present time I have yet to find the names of the individu-
als assigned to the IJA Staff Historical Office in 1893, and cannot confirm they 
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were actually in Meckel’s classes. Further research will hopefully yield these re-
sults and a more direct connection. However, Meckel’s influence is evident in the 
selection of individual battles and campaigns, as a closer examination of the spe-
cific volumes shows a preference for decisive tactical battles. Only three volumes 
(Western Japan, 1911, Kyūshū, also published in 1911, and the Korean invasions, 
1924) examine extended campaigns. Causation is difficult to determine here, but 
whether the selection of these battles as instructional models shaped Japanese 
army attitudes, or it was merely reflective of a preference already present (perhaps 
introduced by Meckel), the line-up is consistent with the later IJA doctrine that 
sought a “decisive battle”, where the spirit of the Japanese soldier would overcome 
even a more technologically advanced or materially equipped enemy. The next 
section will look at the volumes in relation to the events and currents at their time 
of publication; I will highlight four (Sekigahara, Okehazama, Nagashino, and the 
Korean Campaign) in particular as indicative of the sorts of messages and lessons 
the IJA wanted its officers to internalize. 
The IJA staff ’s first volume of military history was published just before their first 
real test as an institution—the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War—and Japan’s career 
as an imperial power began (Harries and Harries 1991). While completed in 1893 
before the beginning of hostilities, I believe the publication to be significant as 
an academic expression of the IJA’s growth; victory versus the Qing would be a 
confirmation of that growth. As the reprinted introduction states, Sekigahara is 
a quintessentially representative (daihyōteki 代表的) campaign, likely the most 
famous and possibly most important battle in Japanese history prior to the Meiji 
period (Sekigahara no Eki, Nihon Senshi vol 1, 1893). For an IJA staff trained by 
Meckel through studying the decisive battles of the Napoleonic and the Fran-
co-Prussian wars, Sekigahara was an obvious place to begin, as the key battle 
that ended the period of endemic warfare known as the “Warring States” period, 
leading to 250 years of peace under the Tokugawa. Though it was not until 1615, 
fifteen years after Sekigahara, that the Winter and Summer Osaka campaigns 
finally destroyed the Toyotomi family that opposed the Tokugawa (covered in vol-
ume 2 of Nihon Senshi), it was victory at Sekigahara that secured control of Japan 
for Tokugawa Ieyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate. Sekigahara was the 
closest Japanese equivalent to studying the decisive battles of the West, like Wa-
terloo or Sedan. The thick book is filled with 393 pages of narrative, followed by 
249 pages of supplementary analysis and 103 pages of reprinted source materials, 
including both narrative and documentary sources. Additionally, supplementa-
ry maps and order of battle charts very clearly display the strategic and tactical 
contexts visually, as well as the economic strength of the combatants which made 
up each side (in terms of domain tax values). As a first effort for the IJA military 
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history office, it is a very thorough “Western”-style campaign analysis; the qual-
ity of the maps and charts especially would not be out of place in any academic 
campaign history produced throughout the twentieth century. The IJA staff thus 
demonstrated that the lessons learned from Meckel could be applied to their own 
military history. 
Japan’s victory over China gained it (and the IJA) a measure of respect; it had 
broken away from the backwardness of non-Europeans, and joined the club of 
modern, advanced, “first rank” nations capable of imposing their will on weaker 
neighbours (Harries and Harries 1991, 59–60). Success in Japan’s first “national” 
war accelerated interest in “native” subjects in general, as the Japanese regained 
a measure of confidence and sense of equality with the West. Consistent with 
this cultural trend, the IJA increased their production of battle histories (Benesch 
2014). After all, first rank militaries needed deeper investigations into their histo-
ries. The complete lack of institutional connection between the sixteenth-century 
forces of the Tokugawa, Oda, and Toyotomi to the IJA was irrelevant; the victo-
ries of specific samurai family armies over other specific family armies displayed 
a “Japanese” history of tactical and operational success, regardless of the fact that 
the losers in these campaigns were also Japanese. 
Five more campaign histories were completed prior to the 1904–05 Russo-Japa-
nese War; three more were begun in 1903, based on the dates listed in the pref-
aces, but the actual publication dates were 1907 (Yanase), 1911 (Western Japan), 
and 1920 (Yamazaki). My assumption, as the publisher lists no explanation, is that 
the Russo-Japanese War, and the strain it put on the IJA General Staff, redirected 
even the military history section’s efforts. Two of this group of campaign histories 
require additional comment. 
The volume on Okehazama, the third study begun and published in 1902, exam-
ines the 1560 battle that launched Oda Nobunaga from being a petty warlord 
onto a twenty-two year path towards national political pre-eminence and started 
the process of unification. Nobunaga, leading a force of less than 3,000 troops, 
used superior tactics and the element of surprise to destroy Imagawa Yoshimoto’s 
vastly superior force of 25,000. Ōe (1985) notes that this battle, an example of a 
smaller opponent defeating a much stronger one through superior cunning and 
surprise, was a favourite historical model for the Japanese military; the defeat 
of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1904 and the attack on the US fleet at 
Pearl Harbor in 1941 were naval operations that drew heavily on the principles 
displayed at Okehazama. However, one wonders if this example was over-em-
phasized, with disastrous results for the nation: while there were certainly addi-
tional cultural influences, the prominent example of a smaller yet dedicated force 
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overcoming insurmountable odds is certainly consistent with Japanese military 
decisions at both the strategic (challenging the United States despite the clear 
understanding of how overmatched Japan would be) and tactical ( Japanese units 
continuing to fight losing battles in the field well after it would have been prudent 
to retreat and regroup) levels. 
Volume 6, the Battle of Nagashino, published in 1903, attempts to place a Japa-
nese battle at the forefront of early modern military developments. Based largely 
on the Oze Hoan’s Shinchōki account of the battle between Oda Nobunaga and 
Tokugawa Ieyasu against Takeda Katsuyori, the IJA assessment makes the case 
that Nobunaga used 3,000 arquebusiers in a rotational formation to destroy the 
charge of the Takeda cavalry (Nagashino no eki, Nihon Senshi, vol. 6, 1903). Like 
the 1912 account of Nagashino by Lt. Gen Oshiage Morizō, the IJA staff account 
posits that a Japanese military force was using revolutionary tactics with the “new” 
technology of firearms, contemporary with similar developments by armies in 
early modern Europe (Oshiage 1965). As Oshiage does not provide a bibliog-
raphy for his 1912 publication, asserting definite influence by the Nihon Sen-
shi volume on Nagashino would be conjecture. Oshiage’s argument stems largely 
from his position as IJA chief of weapons procurement during the Russo-Japanese 
War; it could even be interpreted as an argument internal to the IJA for advanced 
weapons technology by the chief of the office responsible for such. While it would 
stand to reason that Oshiage would be familiar with the volume produced by the 
IJA, the larger point is that influence or not, multiple military officers within the 
IJA were making claims to advanced, even “modern” antecedents in their invented 
institutional histories. 
Recent scholarship demonstrates that this interpretation, especially the image of 
the “rotating volley fire” as derived from the Shinchōki, is significantly flawed. Oze 
Hoan was not present at the battle, and though the work is a hagiography of Oda 
Nobunaga, his discussion of Nagashino concentrates almost entirely on the forces 
of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the junior commander to Nobunaga at the battle but the 
shōgun of Japan at the time of Oze’s writing in 1610 (Oze 1981). However, the IJA 
account in Nihon Senshi was uncritically used by historians and gained traction in 
the popular media. Sir George Sansom relies on the account for his description of 
Nagashino in his 1963 A History of Japan, Volume II, 1334–1615; Geoffrey Parker 
cites Nagashino in his 1988 The Military Revolution, going so far as to call Akira 
Kurosawa’s depiction in the 1984 movie Kagemusha a “credible reconstruction”. 
(Parker 1988, 140). The best recent works that shed light on the popular image 
of Nagashino and its flaws are the section on the topic in Tho mas Conlan’s 2008 
book Weapons and Fighting Techniques of the Samurai Warrior, 1200–1877 AD and 
Fujimoto Masayuki’s 2010 Nagashino no Tatakai: Nobunaga no Shōin, Katsuyori no 
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Haiin (The Battle of Nagashino: Sources for Nobunaga’s Vic tory, Sources of Katsuyori’s 
Defeat). Fujimoto should be credited in earlier work with bringing forward the 
Shinchōkōki, by Ōta Gyūichi, Nobunaga’s personal secretary and a participant at 
the battle, as a more credible account.5
After a hiatus during and for a short time after the Russo-Japanese War, produc-
tion of campaign histories resumed in 1908. Victory over the Russians changed 
the IJA’s self-narrative. Whereas victory against the “backwards” Qing in 1895 
was attributed to Japan’s superior ability to industrialize and adapt to advanced 
modern warfare, the victory over Russia was attributed to a uniquely “Japanese” 
spirit of bravery and self-sacrifice (Benesch 2014; Drea 2009). The government 
and press played up the bravery and sacrifice of the Japanese soldiers and sailors 
who gave their lives for the emperor in Manchuria, rhetorically making individual 
sacrifice the key to victory. This unintentional encouragement of reckless attacks 
against prepared positions was observed against the Russians and extended into 
the famous “banzai” attacks seen against U.S. forces in World War II. Meckel’s 
admonitions to his IJA students to “act instead of think” certainly influenced this 
mentality, though clearly as a part of a greater confluence of discourses. Benesch 
(2014) demonstrates that a discourse about a “traditional” value labelled “bushidō” 
provided a philosophical justification for self-sacrifice for the Emperor. The mili-
tary’s educational curriculum reflected this shift, as bushidō became a formal part 
of the service regulations in 1909 (Harries and Harries 1991). Likewise, Orbach 
(2017) shows that the “three unifiers” were not the only models for military ac-
tion; the shishi, the young samurai who propelled the Meiji Revolution of 1868, 
were the very personification of “reckless action in the name of the Emperor” as a 
successful model. The teachings of Meckel gave an external corroboration to this 
prioritization of action over deliberation, coming from the leading global military 
power of the time. 
The IJA began distancing itself from European advisers in the wake of the Rus-
so-Japanese War, for two reasons. First, Japan had just beaten a European (if 
somewhat weakened) power, through her subjects’ inherently superior spirit; what 
5 My own analysis of Nagashino, based on extensive analysis of the terrain around the site and the 
force composition of each army, indicates that while Oda Nobunaga’s guns were important, they 
were neither revolutionary nor decisive; Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu’s use of obstacles and 
terrain, along with a deception plan to entice their Takeda opponents into attacking their much 
greater-size force, were the primary reasons for victory. Nagashino was the topic of my MA re-
search at the University of Hawaii, and a project to which I will return at some future point. While 
I disagree with Fujimoto’s over-emphasis of the competing Shinchōkōki narrative account as a 
source, he ably demonstrates that however many guns Nobunaga may have had at Nagashino, they 
were not as central to the victory as commonly believed. A recent translation of the Shinchōkōki by 
Jeroen Lamers and Jurgas Elisonas is also worth consideration. 
170 Nathan H. Ledbetter: Invented Histories
need did she have to learn from the West anymore? Second, the less-favoura-
ble-than-expected settlement, with no indemnity paid by Russia through the in-
tervention of other Western powers in the negotiation process, somewhat soured 
the Japanese on the West; Though it continued in alliance with Great Britain, the 
Japanese military appears to have believed it had graduated to a more equal level 
with its former European teachers (Benesch 2014). The histories produced from 
1908 to 1913 (Komaki, Kyūshū, and Odawara6) finish the campaigns of Oda 
Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi to unify Japan in the 1500s. None of these 
analyses are individually remarkable, but the symbolism of the nation unified un-
der military leadership through these campaigns should not be ignored. 
From 1913 until 1924, no new volumes of Nihon Senshi were published (Volume 
8, covering the Yamazaki campaign of Hideyoshi, was published in 1920, after 
having been delayed during the Russo-Japanese War. The length of this delay 
likely indicates where it fell on the priority list). Over the intervening decades, 
Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and participated on the winning side in World War 
I. However, international challenges to Japan’s claims of sovereignty over Korea, 
plus the manner in which Japan was treated with minimal respect by its European 
and American allies at the Versailles Conference in 1919, followed by the U.S. and 
Britain forcing limitations on the number of ships the Imperial Japanese Navy 
could have at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference, resulted in Japan’s disil-
lusionment with the West growing stronger. Military academy history education 
at this time, according to a British observer, consisted of the Russo-Japanese War 
and medieval examples of bravery and sacrifice designed to instil national confi-
dence and pride, with little to no study of tactical lessons (Harries and Harries 
1991, 144). Rather than Western-based tactics, it appears, military leaders placed 
confidence in “Japanese spirit” to overcome the enemy. 
Despite this seeming lack of interest in the study of operations and tactics, how-
ever, in 1924 the last volume in the IJA campaign series, on Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 
invasion of Korea in the 1590s, was released. The largest book of the entire series, 
with 449 pages of main narrative followed by 168 pages of supplementary nar-
rative, 258 pages of reprinted primary documents, and a final 255 pages of bio-
graphical essays, it is massive. It also has the largest set of maps and supplemen-
tary documents. The temporal separation is noteworthy. The right-wing thinker 
Suzuki Chikara had pointed to Hideyoshi’s Korean expedition as a precedent for 
Japanese intervention on the peninsula in his 1893 work Kokumin no Shin Sei shin 
(New Spirit of the Japanese Race) (Benesch 2014, 67). In 1919 a rebellion in Korea 
6 The Odawara volume (vol. 12) is problematic; the preface is dated 1913, but the publication date is 
listed in the reprint as 1893. In the absence of other evidence, I am considering this an error on the 
part of the reprint publisher. 
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had to be suppressed after nine years of colonial rule. I interpret the IJA General 
Staff Historical Section’s choice to compile and release a volume on a Japanese 
invasion of Korea to be a significant attempt to tie contemporary policies to a 
historical past. As has been mentioned, there was no actual historical link from 
Hideyoshi’s armies to the IJA. However, as the IJA studied the operational and 
logistical needs of maintaining forces stationed in Korea, a historical presenta-
tion of early modern Japanese troops performing the same sorts of duties in a 
conquered Korea provided a sense of historical legitimacy and ties to the past, 
not the least of which would be a sense that the current situation was rectifying 
Hideyoshi’s failure to defeat the Koreans and Chinese in 1598.
The thirteen volumes of Nihon Senshi were produced over a period of signifi-
cant change for the Imperial Japanese Army. By tying the military institution of 
modern Japan to examples on the border of the medieval and early modern, the 
IJA staff participated in the same process of history creation as those historians 
who created a feudal “medieval” era in Japan’s past or thinkers who invented a 
“traditional” Japanese spirit called bushidō. Like those instances of the invention 
of tradition, the IJA’s codification of Japanese military history had transnational 
origins as well, as Major Jakob Meckel’s German influence on the tactical and op-
erational levels of warfare shaped the focus of the IJA General Staff in both their 
choices of history to study and their conceptions of future military planning. The 
IJA Staff interpretations contained in Nihon Senshi not only influenced military 
thinkers, but propagated a version of these campaigns that place regional military 
forces as national sources of pride and international leaders in military tactics and 
technology.
This essay is far from a comprehensive review of Nihon Senshi. However, it is clear 
that further analysis of these texts will not only serve as useful for the scholar of 
medieval Japan to see the transmission of battlefield historiography, but also show 
that the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff, even in a minor bureaucratic sec-
tion such as the Military History Office, was an active participant in Meiji and 
Taishō era discourses framing Japan and Japanese institutions against the back-
drop of emerging modernity.  
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